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Abstract.	  
	  
This	  paper	  provides	  further	  analysis	  of	  an	  emerging	  ‘liaison’	  based	  approach	  to	  
the	  policing	  of	  public	  order	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  (Gorringe	  et	  al,	  2012).	  Data	  is	  
gathered	  from	  a	  range	  of	  sources	  including	  direct	  observation	  of	  a	  series	  of	  six	  
protest	  events	  across	   two	  cities	   in	  England	  between	  May	  and	  November	  2012.	  
The	  research	  was	  conducted	  using	  principles	  of	  ‘participant	  observation’	  within	  
an	  ‘action	  research’	  framework	  (Lewin,	  1958).	  The	  qualitative	  analysis	  suggests	  
that	  liaison	  based	  approaches	  are	  effective	  where	  they	  enhance	  police	  capacity	  
for	   problem	   solving,	   conflict	   reduction,	   limit	   setting	   and	   mediating	   during	  
protest	   events.	   It	   asserted	   that	   liaison	   based	   tactics	   can	   be	   undermined,	  
however,	   through	   poor	   understanding	   of	   the	   approach	   among	   police	  
commanders	  and	  inadequate	  sensitivity	  to	  interactions	  between	  police	  tactics,	  
protest	   identities,	   ideology	   and	   history.	   The	   implications	   of	   the	   data	   for	  
understanding	   wider	   debates	   concerning	   iterative	   processes	   between	  
‘transgressive’	   protest	   and	   shifts	   toward	   strategic	   facilitation	   are	   discussed	  
(Gillham,	  2011).	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Introduction.	  
This	  paper	  has	  two	  central	  aims.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  provide	  an	  analysis	  of	  processes	  
governing	   the	   outcomes	   of	   a	   new	   ‘liaison’	   based	   approach	   to	   the	   policing	   of	  
public	  order	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  (Gorringe	  et	  al,	  2011,	  2012).	  The	  second	  is	  to	  
reflect	   upon	   the	   relevance	   of	   ‘liaison	   based	   public	   order	   policing’	   to	   wider	  
debates	  in	  the	  academic	  literature	  about	  shifts	  toward	  ‘strategic	  incapacitation’	  
(Gillham,	  2011;	  Gillham	  et	  al,	  2012).	  
	  
Sociological	  	  understanding	  of	  approaches	  to	  protest	  management.	  
Contemporary	   sociological	   theory	   suggests	   three	   separate	   and	   distinct	  
approaches	  to	  the	  policing	  of	  protest.	  First,	  during	  the	  1960	  and	  70’s	  police	  in	  
the	  USA	  are	  understood	   to	  have	   relied	  upon	   ‘escalated	   force’.	   Even	   a	   cursory	  
glance	  at	  the	  policing	  of	  the	  US	  civil	  rights	  marches	  of	  the	  1960’s	  captures	  the	  
essence	   of	   this	  method	   (Stott,	  Drury	  &	  Reicher,	   2012)	  which	   revolved	   around	  
“the	  use	  of	  arrest,	  beatings,	  tear	  gas,	  bullets	  and	  other	  weapons	  meant	  to	  quell	  
protests	   by	   inflicting	   pain	   and	   suffering”	   (Gillham	   et	   al,	   2012;	   p.2).	   With	   its	  
inherent	   injustices	   the	   approach	   became	   increasingly	   unsustainable	   within	   a	  
democratic	   context	   and	   it	   is	   widely	   understood	   to	   have	   been	   gradually	  
superseded	  by	  a	  second,	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘negotiated	  management’	  (McPhail	  et	  al,	  
1998;	  McCarthy	  and	  McPhail,	  1998).	  The	  latter	  showing	  greater	  respect	  for	  ‘first	  
amendment	  rights’,	  greater	  tolerance	  for	  disruption	  to	  the	  community,	  higher	  
levels	  of	   communication	  and	   therefore	   less	   reliance	  on	  arrests	   and	   the	  use	  of	  
force.	  	  	  
	  
Underpinning	   this	   shift	   toward	   negotiated	   management	   was	   a	   legislative	  
framework	   that	   required	   protests	   to	   be	   officially	   ‘permitted’	   (McCarthy	   and	  
McPhail,	   1998).	   Gillham	   et	   al	   (2011)	   argues	   that	   this	   introduced	   a	   level	   of	  
‘control’	   for	   the	   police	   since	   it	   forced	   protest	   organisers	   to	   meet	   with	   them	  
beforehand	   to	   set	   out	   and	   agree	   the	   parameters	   of	   protest.	   Such	   meetings	  
reassured	  police	  since	  they	  facilitated	  the	  collection	  of	  information	  and	  opened	  
up	  routes	  of	  communication	  that	  helped	  reduce	  the	  likelihood	  of	  conflict.	  It	  is	  
understood	   that	   the	  method	   also	   fitted	  well	  with	   the	   “newly	  professionalized	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social	  movement	  organisations”	  which	  Gillham	  (2011;	  p.638)	  argues,	  “wanted	  to	  
direct	   attention	   away	   from	   police	   confrontations”	   toward	   the	   issues	   around	  
which	  they	  were	  actually	  protesting.	  	  
	  
Gillham’s	   analysis,	   however,	   sets	   out	   the	   case	   for	   a	   further	  paradigm	   shift,	   to	  
the	  predominance	  of	   a	   third	   approach	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘strategic	   incapacitation’	  
defined	  as	  the	  excessive	  controlling	  of	  space	  to	  isolate	  and	  contain	  potentially	  
disruptive	  protest,	   the	  use	  of	  pre-­‐emptive	  arrest,	  surveillance	  and	  information	  
sharing	  (Gillham,	  2011;	  p637).	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  this	  shift	  was	  partly	  driven	  by	  the	  
emergence	   of	   ‘transgressive’	   protest	   movements	   in	   the	   late	   1990s,	   who	   were	  
unwilling	  through	  ideology	  and	  unable	  through	  leadership	  structure	  to	  engage	  
in	  the	   formal	   ‘permit’	   setting	  process	   (Gillham	  et	  al,	  2012).	  The	   lack	  of	   formal	  
engagement,	  combined	  with	   the	   intention	  of	   these	  groups	   to	  disrupt	   through	  
direct	   action,	   was	   ill	   suited	   to	   negotiated	   management,	   culminating	  
consequently	  in	  the	  ‘Battle	  of	  Seattle’	  (Gillham	  &	  Marx,	  2000).	  The	  shift	  toward	  
‘strategic	   incapacitation’	   took	   place	   as	   a	   means	   of	   ‘neutralising’	   the	   risks	   to	  
police	   contained	   within	   this	   form	   of	   protest	   (Gainer,	   2001;	   Kaufman,	   2002;	  
Noakes	  et	  al,	  2005;	  cited	  in	  Gillham,	  2011).	  	  
	  
Sociological	  theory	  therefore	  proposes	  a	  macro	  social	  and	  historical	  interaction	  
between	  the	  tactics	  of	  protest	  movements	  and	  policing,	  whereby	  over	  time	  –	  in	  
this	   case	   years	   -­‐	   general	   patterns	   of	   protest	   policing	   emerge	   across	   nation	  
states.	  Additionally,	   it	   is	   suggested	   that	   transgressive	   protests	   are	   linked	   to	   a	  
shift	   away	   from	   negotiated	   management	   toward	   a	   pattern	   of	   strategic	  
incapacitation,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   USA.	   As	   Gillham	   et	   al	   (2012)	   point	   out	   this	  
“iterative	   and	   interactive	   process…	   should	   be	   the	   focus	   of	   subsequent	  
research”(p.18).	  It	  is	  further	  suggested	  that	  elements	  of	  strategic	  incapacitation	  
are	   evident	   in	   studies	   of	   the	   policing	   of	   protest	   in	   nations	   such	   as	   Sweden	  
(Wahlstrom,	  2010)	  and	  Scotland	  (Gorringe	  et	  al,	  2011)	  and	  that	  “further	  research	  
is	  needed	  to	  determine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  strategic	  incapacitation	  tactics	  have	  
diffused	  to	  other	  democratic	  nations”	  (p.19).	  This	  paper	  aims	  to	  contribute	  such	  
research.	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Liaison	  Based	  Public	  Order	  Policing	  and	  Human	  Rights.	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  apparent	  shift	  toward	  ‘strategic	  incapacitation’	  in	  the	  USA	  the	  
situation	   in	   Western	   Europe	   is	   arguably	   more	   nuanced.	   Waddington	   (2007;	  
p.138)	  argues	  that	  the	  dominant	  PO	  policing	  approach	  is	  a	  function	  of	  a	  range	  
of	  variables.	  Prevalent	  among	  these	  are	  the	  philosophical	  basis	  of	  policing	  and	  
the	  lessons	  learnt	  from	  previous	  events	  (p.138).	  Of	  particular	  importance	  in	  this	  
respect	   have	   been	   the	   scrutiny	   surrounding	   the	   2001	   Gothenburg	   summit	   in	  
Sweden	  (Peterson	  and	  Oskarsson,	  2006)	  and	  the	  2009	  G20	  summit	  in	  London	  
(HMIC,	  2009a,	  b).	  
	  
In	   both	   cases	   inquiries	   have	   set	   in	   motion	   policy	   reforms	   that	   are	   tied	   to	  
philosophies	   of	   democratic	   policing,	   oriented	   toward	   the	   maintenance	   of	  
human	   rights	   and	   based	   upon	   dialogue	   and	   the	   proportionate	   use	   of	   force	  
(HMIC,	  2009b;	  SOU,	  2002).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  ‘lessons	  learnt’	  have	  about	  the	  
fundamental	   importance	   of	   negotiated	   management	   to	   democratic	   policing.	  
These	   reforms	   are	   gradually	   leading	   to	   the	   development	   of	   an	   approach	   that	  
Gorringe	  et	  al	  (2011)	  refer	  to	  as	  ‘strategic	  facilitation’	  (p.129),	  through	  a	  capacity	  
that	  we	  wish	  to	  term	  ‘liaison	  based	  public	  order	  policing’.	  
	  
In	   part,	   these	   reforms	   are	   fundamentally	   European	   because	   they	   are	  
underpinned	  by	  the	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (ECHR)	  alongside	  
the	  piecemeal	  adoption	  of	   legislation	  within	  nation	  states	   that	  requires	  police	  
to	  act	   in	  a	  manner	   that	   is	   compliant	  with	   it.	  For	  example,	   the	  Human	  Rights	  
Act	  (1998)	  in	  the	  UK	  creates	  a	  legal	  obligation	  for	  the	  police	  not	  to	  inhibit	  and	  
to	   positively	   facilitate	   the	   rights	   of	   freedom	  of	   expression,	   consciousness	   and	  
assembly	   that	   are	   protected	   under	   Articles	   9,	   10	   and	   11	   of	   the	   ECHR.	  Whilst	  
interference	  with	   these	   rights	   can	   and	  does	   occur,	   it	   can	   only	   be	  undertaken	  
lawfully	  if	  clear	  and	  stringent	  criteria	  are	  met.	  Moreover,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  lawful,	  
the	   use	   of	   force	   or	   surveillance	   by	   the	   police	   has	   to	   be	   proportionate	   and	  
comply	  with	  Article	  8	  of	  the	  ECHR	  (Stott	  &	  Gorringe,	  2012).	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Additionally,	   these	  reforms	  have	  utilised	  the	  Elaborated	  Social	   Identity	  Model	  
of	   crowd	   behaviour	   (ESIM)	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   understanding	   the	   social	  
psychological	   basis	   of	   collective	   action	   within	   crowd	   events.	   This	   theoretical	  
model	   helps	   explain	   the	   complex	   relationship	   between	   police	   tactics	   and	   the	  
escalations	  of	  conflicts	  observed	  during	  crowd	  events	  (Gillham	  and	  Marx,	  2000;	  
Stott	  and	  Drury,	  2000;	  Reicher,	  1996)	  but	  also	  assists	  in	  defining	  the	  principles,	  
strategies	  and	  tactics	  police	  can	  adopt	  to	  avoid	  such	  major	  escalations	  (Reicher	  
et	  al,	  2004,	  2007;	  Stott,	  2011;	  Stott	  et	  al,	  2007,	  2008).	  	  
	  
Liaison	  based	  public	  order	  policing	  was	  initially	  developed	  in	  Stockholm	  where	  
a	   unit	   of	   ‘dialogue	   police’	   was	   created	   as	   part	   of	   a	   wider	   set	   of	   public	   order	  
police	   reforms,	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   Special	   Police	   Tactic	   (SPT),	   following	   the	  
major	   riots	   in	  Gothenburg	   in	   2001	   (Holgersson	  &	  Knutsson,	   2011;	   Stott,	   2011).	  
But	  more	  recently,	  similar	  units	  of	  police	  liaison	  officers	  (PLTs)	  have	  also	  been	  
developed	   and	   deployed	   within	   the	   UK	   (Gorringe	   et	   al,	   2012;	   Waddington,	  
2012).	   These	   liaison	   officers	   add	   a	   low	   level	   problem-­‐solving	   capability	   to	   a	  
public	  order	  policing	  operation	  and	  mediate	  in	  situations	  of	  emergent	  tension.	  
To	   achieve	   this	   they	  wear	   a	  distinct	  uniform	   (in	   the	   case	   if	  PLTs	   a	   light	  blue	  
tabard	   with	   ‘Liaison	   Officer’	   written	   on	   it)	   and	   adopt	   a	   ‘non-­‐repressive’	  
approach	   before,	   during	   and	   after	   crowd	   events	   to	   establish	   relationships	   of	  
trust	   with	   protesters.	   In	   turn,	   these	   relationships,	   and	   the	   contextualised	  
knowledge	   that	   flows	   from	   them,	   helps	   to	   improve	   police	   decision	   making	  
during	   crowd	   events,	   often	   correcting	   inaccurate	   assumptions	   and	   pre-­‐
conceptions	   about	   emerging	   risks,	  mitigating	   police	   tendency	   to	   use	   force	   to	  
arrest	  disperse	  or	  contain	  a	  crowd	  as	  a	  whole	  (Gorringe	  et	  al,	  2012;	  Stott,	  2011)	  
	  
Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  liaison	  based	  public	  order	  policing	  is	  intended	  to	  avoid	  the	  
use	   of	   indiscriminate	   force,	   enhance	   human	   rights	   and	   facilitate	   democratic	  
forms	   of	   protest,	  Wahlstrom	   (2007)	   is	   critical	   of	   the	   approach.	  He	   notes	   the	  
tension	   between	   instrumental	   police	   objectives	   and	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   dialogue.	  
Echoing	   Waddington’s	   (1994)	   scepticism	   about	   negotiated	   management,	  
Wahlstrom	  is	  unsure	  whether	  dialogue	  policing	  will	   result	   in	   ‘genuinely	  more	  
	   6	  
democratic	  forms	  of	  protest	  policing,	  or	  merely	  lead	  to	  nothing	  but	  more	  subtle	  
forms	   of	   coercion’	   (2007;	   p.	   400).	   Wahlstrom	   (2007;	   p.397)	   also	   argues	   that	  
many	  ‘public	  order	  commanders’	  distrust	  the	  tactic	  and	  resent	  having	  to	  engage	  
with	  protesters	  whom	  have	  no	  desire	  to	  reciprocate,	  especially	  as	  the	  results	  of	  
dialogue	  are	  not	  always	  immediately	  apparent.	  	  
	  
Whilst	   these	   are	   valid	   criticisms,	   the	   available	   research	   does	   suggest	   that	  
liaison-­‐based	   public	   order	   policing	   is	   successful	   at	   preventing	   conflict	   and	  
therefore	   undermining	   shifts	   toward	   tactics	   associated	   with	   strategic	  
incapacitation	   and	   escalated	   force	   (Gorringe	   et	   al,	   2011,	   2012;	   Waddington,	  
2012).	   Despite	   the	   growing	   importance	   of	   these	   developments	   in	   protest	  
policing	  in	  Western	  Europe	  –	  both	  for	  theory	  and	  practice	  –	  empirical	  research	  
of	   crowd	   events	   involving	   PLTs	   remains	   somewhat	   limited.	   The	   available	  
evidence	   from	   the	   UK	   is	   focused	   on	   only	   two	   events	   and	   only	   one	   of	   these	  
where	   the	   new	   PLT	   approach	   was	   deployed.	   As	   such	   there	   is	   no	   systematic	  
analysis	  of	  how	  the	  approach	  might	  apply	  to	  other	  events.	  This	  study	  therefore	  
has	  the	  parallel	  aim	  of	  addressing	  this	  limitation	  in	  research	  by	  undertaking	  an	  




Following	  their	  direct	  involvement	  in	  policy	  reforms	  (Stott,	  2009;	  ACPO,	  2010;	  
HMIC,	   2009b)	   the	   authors	   collaborated	   to	   develop	   the	   first	   PLT,	  which	   then	  
served	  as	  the	  model	  for	  the	  subsequent	  development	  of	  ‘liaison	  officers’	  across	  
England	  and	  Wales.	  As	  a	   consequence	   the	  Metropolitan	  Police	  Service	   (MPS)	  
invited	  the	  first	  and	  second	  authors	  to	  act	  as	  advisors	  to	  their	  public	  order	  unit	  
for	   the	   initiation	   of	   MPS	   PLT	   capability,	   which	   became	   operational	   in	   April	  
2012.	   In	  parallel	   the	  authors	  were	  employed	  by	  Sussex	  Police	   to	  advise	  on	  the	  
development	  of	  and	  to	  train	  a	  PLT	  that	  became	  operational	  in	  June	  2012.	  	  
	  
The	  general	  approach	  to	  data	  gathering	  for	  this	  study	  is	  therefore	  based	  upon	  
principles	   of	   ‘participant	   observation’	   within	   an	   ‘action	   research’	   framework	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(Drury	  and	  Stott,	  2001;	  French	  and	  Bell,	  1973;	  Johnson,	  1976;	  Lewin,	  1958).	  Their	  
advisory	   role	   involved	   undertaking	   observations	   of	   a	   series	   of	   six	   protests	  
involving	  PLT	  deployment	  during	  which	  data	  was	  gathered.	  Observations	  with	  
the	   MPS	   included:	   1)	   a	   protest	   by	   ‘Occupy’	   on	   Tuesday	   15th	   May	   2012;	   2)	   a	  
protest	   by	   ‘UKUncut’	   on	   Saturday	   26th	   May	   2012;	   3)	   a	   protest	   by	   the	   Trades	  
Union	  Council	  on	  the	  20th	  October	  2012;	  4)	  a	  demonstration	  by	  United	  Friends	  
and	  Families	  Campaign	  on	  27th	  October	  2012.	  Observations	  with	  Sussex	  Police	  
included:	   1)	   UKUncut’s	   ‘street	   party’	   on	   Friday	   1st	   June	   2012	   and,	   2)	   a	   ‘Smash	  
EDO’	  demonstration	  march	  on	  Monday	  the	  4th	  June	  2012.	  	  
	  
This	   study	   draws	   data	   from	   participation	   concerning	   the	   processes	  
underpinning	   the	   development	   and	   deployment	   of	   PLTs	   in	   these	   two	   force	  
areas	   up	   to	   and	   including	   the	   above	   events.	   During	   each	   of	   the	   events	   the	  
authors	   attended	   relevant	  briefings	   for	   both	   the	  PLT	   and	  other	   ‘public	   order’	  
resources.	  Where	  possible,	  commanders	  and	  PLTs	  were	  interviewed.	  To	  avoid	  a	  
‘police-­‐centric’	   analysis	  and	   to	  assess	   the	  efficacy	  of	  police	   tactics	   the	  authors	  
also	   attended	   the	   demonstrations	   taking	   photographs,	   making	   observations	  
and	  conducting	  contemporaneous	  interviews	  with	  police,	  protestors	  and	  other	  
members	   of	   the	   public	   about	   the	   situations	   confronting	   them	   and	   their	  
responses	  to	  it.	  No	  data	  was	  recorded	  on	  the	  number	  of	  individuals	  spoken	  to	  
or	  their	  demographic	  characteristics.	  All	  data	  were	  recorded	  as	  field	  notes	  and	  
are	  entirely	  qualitative.	  	  
	  
During	   the	   research	   period	   the	  MPS	   utilised	   PLTs	   between	   50-­‐60	   occasions,	  
including	  demonstrations	  surrounding	  the	  Olympics.	  Sussex	  Police	  also	  utilised	  
their	   liaison	  officers	  on	  a	  number	  of	  demonstrations	  above	  and	  beyond	   those	  
formally	   included	   in	   the	   observational	   data.	   Throughout	   the	   research	   period,	  
therefore,	   a	   number	   of	   opportunities	   emerged	   to	   gain	   feedback	   from	   PLTs	  
through	   formal	   and	   informal	   channels.	   In	   particular,	   the	   first	   author	   was	  
invited	   to	   attend	   an	  MPS	   formal	  debrief	   for	  PLTs	   involved	   in	   the	  majority	   of	  
PLT	   deployments	   which	   took	   place	   at	   force	   Headquarters	   on	   12th	   September	  
2012.	  This	  data	  is	  also	  included	  in	  the	  analysis.	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Consequently,	   the	  analysis	   is	  broken	   into	   two	  major	   sections.	  The	   first	  draws	  
upon	   the	   data	   gathered	   through	   observation.	   The	   data	   from	   each	   event	   was	  
collated	   and	   then	   considered	   thematically.	   Each	   of	   the	   six	   events	   was	   then	  
compared	  to	  each	  other	  and	  the	  themes	  were	  shaped	  and	  reshaped	  until	  they	  
provided	   ‘best	   fit’	   to	   the	   data	   as	   a	   whole.	   The	   themes	   that	   emerged	   are	  
organised	  into	  the	  analytic	  framework	  presented	  below.	  For	  reasons	  of	  brevity,	  
single	   examples	   are	  used	   to	   convey	   the	  processes	   evident	   in	   the	   general	   data	  
corpus	   and	   this	   section	   of	   the	   analysis	   is	   therefore	   sub-­‐headed	   by	   thematic	  
category.	  The	  second	  major	   section	  draws	  upon	  data	  gathered	   informally	  and	  
formally	  from	  the	  PLTs	  during	  debriefs.	  Here	  their	  comments	  were	  explored	  for	  
the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	   experiences	   of	   PLTs	   across	   the	  wider	   array	   of	   events	  
help	   reflect	   upon	   the	   thematic	   categories	   identified	   by	   the	   authors	   in	   the	  
observational	   data.	   In	   this	   section	   utterances	   are	   presented	   to	   reflect	   the	  
comments	  as	  they	  were	  written	  in	  field	  notes	  taken	  by	  the	  first	  author.	  Taken	  
together,	   these	   data	   sources	   offer	   an	   insight	   into	   both	   the	   operational	   logic	  
underpinning	  the	  deployment	  of	  PLTs,	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  	  
	  
Analysis	  
Problem	  solving,	  conflict	  reduction,	  limit	  setting	  and	  mediating.	  
On	  Tuesday	   15th	  May	   the	   ‘Occupy’	  movement	  organised	   a	  protest	   against	   the	  
British	  Bankers	  Association	  (BAA)	  in	  central	  London1.	  The	  ‘Occupy’	  movement	  
at	   this	   time	   presented	   problems	   for	   police	   internationally	   because	   of	   their	  
tactics	   of	   civil	   disobedience,	   usually	   involving	   occupying	   public	   and	   private	  
space	   for	   long	   periods	   of	   time2.	   The	   preceding	   Saturday	   another	   Occupy	  
demonstration	   had	   developed	   into	   a	   large-­‐scale	   containment,	   followed	   by	  
significant	  confrontations	  between	  protestors	  and	  City	  of	  London	  police,	  along	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  expressed	   intention	  of	  protestors	  was	   to	   assemble	   at	  Russell	   Square	   and	  process	   to	   the	  
British	  Bankers	  Association	  Headquarters	  (BBA)	  in	  Old	  Broad	  Street	  within	  the	  City	  of	  London,	  
some	  two	  miles	  away.	  2	  The	  most	  publicised	  incident	  of	  which	  in	  the	  U.K.	  was	  the	  camp	  outside	  of	  St	  Paul’s	  Cathedral	  
that	   took	  place	  between	  October	   2011	   and	  February	   2012.	  Whilst	   bailiffs	   cleared	   the	   St	  Paul’s	  
camp	  on	  the	  28th	  of	  February	  2012,	  the	  ‘Occupy’	  movement	  was	  still	  popular	  and	  a	  second	  camp	  
was	  still	  on	  going	  in	  nearby	  Finsbury	  Square.	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with	  at	  least	  eleven	  arrests	  and	  accusations	  by	  protestors	  of	  heavy	  handed	  and	  
illegitimate	   policing3.	   This	   previous	   demonstration	   did	   not	   deploy	   PLTs	   and	  
was	  not	  included	  in	  the	  data	  corpus	  but	  is	  included	  here	  as	  the	  event	  provided	  
a	  context	  for	  both	  demonstrators	  and	  police.	  
	  
The	  MPS	  Silver4	  commander	  responsible	  for	  the	  demonstration	  on	  the	  15th	  was	  
determined	   to	   avoid	   scenes	   of	   similar	   confrontation	   and	   saw	   the	   (then	  
experimental)	  PLTs	  as	  a	  tool	   for	  achieving	  his	  strategic	  goal	  of	   facilitating	  the	  
protest.	  Nonetheless,	  given	  the	  recent	  context,	  a	  considerable	  number	  of	  public	  
order	  resources	  were	  mobilised	  to	  support	  the	  operation5.	  Tactical	  deployment	  
began	  on	  the	  evening	  before	  the	  protest,	  where	  Silver	  tasked	  the	  PLT	  to	  go	  to	  
the	   ‘Occupy’	   camp	   at	   Finsbury	   Square.	   Their	   brief	   was	   to	   deliberately	   and	  
explicitly	   begin	   the	   tricky	   process	   of	   establishing	   contact	   with	   protestors,	  
communicating	  with	   them	  about	   the	   facilitatory	   role	   of	   the	  PLT,	   providing	   a	  
channel	  of	   liaison	  and	  dialogue	  and	  begin	  developing	   trust.	  This	   ‘relationship	  
building’	  deployment	   in	   advance	  of	   a	  protest	   event	   represents	  one	  of	   the	  key	  
distinguishing	  features	  of	  a	  liaison	  based	  approach.	  	  
	  
On	   the	   day	   of	   the	   demonstration	   the	   same	   PLTs	  were	   deployed	   into	   Russell	  
Square	   as	   the	   protest	   was	   assembling.	   Around	   250	   protestors	   arrived	   and	  
marched	  off	   in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  City.	  The	  Bronze6	  Commander	  responsible	  
for	  the	  march	  took	  the	  decision	  not	  to	  deploy	  the	  considerable	  PSU7	  resources	  
at	  his	  disposal,	  but	  to	  allow	  his	  PLTs	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  tactic	  from	  the	  outset.	  
There	   were	   no	   official	   protest	   ‘organisers’	   and	   an	   agreement	   had	   not	   been	  
reached	   with	   the	   MPS	   about	   the	   route	   of	   the	   protest	   and	   throughout	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-­‐england-­‐london-­‐18049010	  4	  Silver	  is	  the	  	  term	  used	  for	  the	  commander	  with	  overall	  tactical	  command	  for	  the	  public	  order	  operation.	  5	  The	  situation	  was	  complicated	  because	  whilst	  the	  protest	  would	  begin	  under	  MPS	  jurisdiction	  
it	  would	  culminate	  with	  a	  rally	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London	  Police.	  6	  Bronze	  is	  the	  term	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  senior	  operational	  commander	  with	  responsibility	  for	  a	  specific	  role	  or	  geographical	  sector.	  7	  A	  Police	  Support	  Unit	  (PSU)	  is	  a	  formation	  of	  18	  constables,	  3	  sergeants	  an	  inspector	  and	  three	  vans	  –	  each	  with	  drivers.	  It	  is	  the	  standard	  unit	  for	  resourcing	  public	  order	  operations	  in	  England	  and	  Wales.	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demonstrators	   walked	   along	   roadways,	   which	   itself	   required	   a	   dynamic	  
surrounding	   traffic	   and	   public	   order	   operation.	   Traffic	   police	   on	  motorcycles	  
stayed	   just	   ahead	   and	   to	   the	   rear	   ensuring	   that	   where	   necessary	   traffic	   was	  
stopped	  and	  redirected.	  	  
	  
Rather	  than	  containing	  the	  march	  within	  an	  escort,	  the	  available	  PSU	  resources	  
would	   ‘leapfrog’	   it,	   parking	   in	   side	   streets	   just	   ahead	   and	   to	   the	   side.	   At	   the	  
same	   time	   PLTs	   walked	   ‘within’	   the	   demonstration	   chatting	   amiably	   to	  
individual	   protestors,	   building	   relationships	   and	   explaining	   their	   role8.	   The	  
second	   hallmark	   of	   PLTs	   is	   played	   out	   here;	   the	   deliberate	   placing	   of	   these	  
distinctly	   uniformed	   officers	   ‘within’	   the	   crowd.	   This	   visibly	   signals	   police	  
rejection	   of	   outmoded	   theories	   of	   the	   madding	   and	   inherently	   dangerous	  
crowd,	   and	   also	   facilitates	   a	   more	   realistic	   and	   dynamic	   assessment	   of	  
protestors’	  intentions,	  demeanour	  and	  behaviour.	  
	  	  
One	   of	   the	   aims	   of	   the	   protest	   was	   to	   engage	   in	   non-­‐violent	   ‘direct	   action’	  
against	   banks	   to	   ‘disrupt’	   their	   business	   and	   highlight	   the	   role	   of	   these	  
organisations	   in	   the	   economic	   crisis.	   As	   the	   march	   moved	   into	   the	   City	  
demonstrators	  would	  periodically	   surround	  a	  bank	  along	  the	  route	  and	  try	   to	  
occupy	  the	  customer	  reception	  area	  or	  place	  bright	  yellow	  tape	  with	  the	  word	  
‘OCCUPY’	   over	   the	   entrances,	   place	   stickers	   on	  windows	   (and	   other	   objects)	  
and	   chalk	   slogans	   onto	   pathways	   and	   other	   surfaces	   outside.	   From	   a	   police	  
perspective,	  whilst	  the	  protestors	  do	  have	  the	  right	  of	  freedom	  of	  assembly	  they	  
do	  not	  have	  this	  right	  on	  private	  property	  and	  the	  use	  of	  the	  tape,	  stickers	  and	  
graffiti	  can	  constitute	  the	  offence	  of	  criminal	  damage.	  Consequently,	  each	  time	  
the	  protestors	  tried	  to	  enter	  a	  bank	  a	  PSU	  rapidly	  deployed	  a	  cordon	  across	  the	  
entrance	   and	   there	  would	   be	   a	   ‘stand	   off’	   outside	  where	   the	   potential	   for	   an	  
arrest	  to	  occur	  or	  for	  conflict	  to	  develop	  was	  relatively	  high.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Forward	  Intelligence	  Teams	  were	  also	  deployed	  but	  remained	  some	  distance	  away.	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As	   a	   consequence	   of	   these	   spontaneous	   ‘direct	   actions’,	   the	   large	   number	   of	  
PSUs	  in	  the	  vicinity	  constantly	  ‘self-­‐deployed’	  in	  order	  to	  assist.	  Some	  of	  these	  
PSUs	   were	   under	   the	   control	   of	   different	   commanders	   and	   even	   a	   different	  
police	  force.	  Recognising	  a	  complexity	  the	  Bronze	  Commander	  was	  essentially	  
faced	   with	   a	   dilemma.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   given	   the	   ‘disruption’	   to	   traffic,	  
obvious	  attempts	   to	  trespass	  and	   ‘criminal	  damage’,	  he	  was	  now	  in	  a	  position	  
where	   he	   could	   lawfully	   deploy	   these	   resources	   to	   contain	   or	   ‘kettle’	   the	  
protest.	   However,	   in	   line	   with	   the	   overarching	   strategy	   and	   recognising	   the	  
potential	   for	   a	   containment	   to	   create	   and	   then	   escalate	   conflict	   he	   chose	  
instead	   to	   accept	   the	   minor	   issues	   being	   created	   by	   the	   direct	   actions	   and	  
retain	  his	  PLTs	  as	  the	  primary	  tactic.	  Unlike	  the	  controlled	  spaces	  of	  ‘strategic	  
incapacitation’,	  it	  was	  evident	  that	  liaison	  based	  approaches	  involved	  tolerating	  
‘disruption’.	  	  
	  
On	   these	   occasions,	   whilst	   leaving	   his	   cordons	   at	   the	   entrances	   in	   place,	   he	  
instructed	  the	  additional	  PSUs	  to	  go	  back	  to	   their	  vehicles	  and	  remain	  out	  of	  
sight.	   He	   then	   used	   his	   PLTs	   to	   negotiate	   with	   protestors	   in	   order	   to	  
communicate	   his	   desire	   to	   continue	   to	   facilitate	   them	   on	   the	   understanding	  
that	   they	  would	  make	   their	   peaceful	   protest	   only	   for	   a	   short	  while	   and	   then	  
continue	  en	  route.	  As	  such	  after	  a	  short	  protest	  outside	  a	  chosen	  bank	  those	  in	  
the	  crowd	  would	  move	  off	  until	  another	  suitable	   target	  was	   identified	  and,	   in	  
contrast	  to	  the	  previous	  Saturday,	  no	  containment	  or	  arrests	  took	  place9.	  
	  
Thus,	  by	  the	  time	  the	  demonstration	  reached	  Old	  Broad	  Street	  many	  –	  but	  not	  
all	  -­‐	  of	  the	  protestors	  appeared	  to	  welcome	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  PLTs	  and	  some	  
engaged	   positively	   in	   communication	   with	   them.	   For	   example,	   an	   emergent	  
categorisation	  appeared	  in	  protestors’	  utterances	  where	  they	  would	  distinguish	  
between	   the	   ‘blue’	   and	   the	   ‘yellow’	   coated	   police.	   When	   interviewed	   some	  
expressed	  how	  the	  friendly	  demeanour	  of	  the	  blue-­‐jacketed	  PLTs	  was	  after	  all	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Although	  one	  arrest	  was	  made	  at	  a	  later	  stage	  
	   12	  
welcome	  contrast	  to	  their	  fears	  of	  containment	  and	  experiences	  of	  more	  hostile	  
‘yellow	  jacket’	  policing	  at	  previous	  events.	  	  
	  
Having	  established	  a	  ‘legitimate’	  place	  within	  the	  demonstration	  the	  PLTs	  were	  
in	  a	  position	  to	  solve	  other	  emergent	  problems,	  in	  ways	  that	  further	  prevented	  
arrests	   and	   potential	   escalations.	   On	   arrival	   at	   the	   BAA,	   the	   protestors	  
surrounded	   the	   entrance	   which	   itself	   was	   cordoned	   off	   by	   a	   PSU.	   Almost	  
immediately	  one	  of	  the	  protestors,	  who	  had	  his	   faced	  covered,	  began	  to	  place	  
tape	  across	  the	  entrance10	  and	  was	  about	  to	  extend	  it	  across	  the	  police	  officers	  
forming	   the	   cordon,	   effectively	   taping	   them	   onto	   the	   wall.	   	   Recognising	   the	  
potential	  for	  escalation	  a	  PLT	  officer	  approached	  the	  individual	  and,	  while	  not	  
threatening	  to	  arrest,	  explained	  that	  should	  he	  continue	  one	  of	  the	  PSU	  officers	  
in	   the	   cordon	  would	   almost	   certainly	   arrest	   him.	  The	   individual	   immediately	  
challenged	   the	   PLT	   officer	   about	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   any	   potential	   arrest	   and	  
questioned	   dismissively	   	   “under	   what	   law’?	   The	   PLT	   officer	   then	   explained	  
calmly	   that	   such	   action	  would	   constitute	   “obstructing	   a	   police	   officer”.	   For	   a	  
few	  seconds	  the	   individual	  considered	  his	  options,	  stopped	  unfurling	  the	  tape	  
and	  moved	  away.	  What	  was	  interesting	  here	  is	  how	  the	  PLT	  differentiated	  itself	  
from	  those	  officers	  who	  would	  potentially	  make	  an	  arrest	  and	  acted	  more	  as	  a	  
mediator	   between	   police	   and	   protestors	   and	   in	   so	   doing	   applied	   police	  
tolerance	  limits	  to	  the	  emergent	  specifics	  of	  ‘direct	  action’	  protest.	  The	  vignette	  
captures	   the	   centrality	   of	   legitimacy	   to	   the	   effective	   functioning	   of	   PLTs	   and	  
the	  necessity	  of	  them	  having	  clearly	  demarcated	  roles.	  	  
	  
Protester	  identity,	  ideology	  &	  history.	  
A	  salient	  issue	  in	  managing	  protest	  lies	  in	  police	  ability	  to	  predict	  what	  is	  likely	  
to	   happen.	   Thus,	   where	   uncertainty	   existed	   it	   was	   always	   a	   priority	   for	  
commanders	   to	   reduce	   it	   by	   gathering	   information	   on	   protestors	   underlying	  
intentions.	  As	  Earl	  and	  Soule	  (2006)	  argue,	  what	  police	  commanders	  fear	  most	  
is	   a	   loss	   of	   control.	   Where	   there	   was	   an	   identified	   protest	   ‘organiser’	   and	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  As	  a	  preemptive	  measure	  the	  front	  entrance	  to	  the	  BAA	  had	  been	  closed	  and	  a	  side	  entrance	  was	  in	  use.	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structural	   hierarchy	   within	   the	   protest	   groups	   this	   was	   less	   of	   an	   issue;	   an	  
identified	  point	  of	  contact	  generating	  information	  about	  underlying	  intentions	  
increased	  police	  confidence	  that	  the	  protesters	  were	  not	  seeking	  to	  act	  illegally	  
and	  that	  the	  police	  would	  be	  able	  to	  respond	  appropriately.	  	  
	  
Direct	   action	   protest	   groups	   like	   ‘Occupy’	   do	   not	   have	   explicit	   hierarchies	   of	  
leadership,	   formal	   membership	   or	   organisation.	   Instead,	   such	   groups	   tend	  
toward	   a	   culture	   of	   loose	   affiliation	   and	   ‘consensus’	   decision-­‐making.	   These	  
groups	   are	   also	   by	   nature	   ‘transgressive’,	   and	   are	   naturally	   reticent	   to	  
communicate	  with	  police	  about	  their	  intentions.	  Some	  groups	  are	  ideologically	  
opposed	   to	   the	   police	   or	   are	   simply	   deeply	  mistrustful	   of	   them	   due	   to	   prior	  
negative	   experiences	   and	   therefore	   will	   not	   engage	   easily,	   if	   at	   all,	   in	   open	  
communication	   with	   police	   (Gillham,	   2012;	   Gorringe	   et	   al,	   2011;	   Vestergren,	  
2011).	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  background	  context	  some	  deployments	  of	  PLTs	  
led	  to	  negative	  reactions.	  	  
	  
Following	  a	  consultancy	  with	  the	  first	  author	  Sussex	  Police	  took	  the	  decision	  to	  
develop	  at	  PLT	  just	  two	  weeks	  before	  a	  forthcoming	  series	  of	  highly	  challenging	  
demonstrations	  within	  the	  city.	  Given	  the	  time	  pressures	  involved	  these	  officers	  
became	   operational	   prior	   to	   receiving	   formal	   training.	   Their	   first	   task	   was	  
making	  contact	  with	   individuals	  they	   judged	  were	   likely	  to	  be	   involved	  in	  the	  
‘organisation’	   of	   the	   forthcoming	   protests.	  Whilst	   positive	   relationships	   were	  
established	   with	   at	   least	   one	   activist,	   two	   liaison	   officers	   –	   not	   wearing	  
uniforms	  -­‐	  visited	  the	  home	  of	  another.	  This	  activist	  was	  disturbed	  by	  the	  visit	  
and	   reacted	   to	   it	   as	   police	   intimidation.	   Rather	   than	   recognising	   the	   distress	  
the	  visit	  was	  causing	  the	  officer	  challenged	  the	  activist	  asserting	  that	  she	  was	  a	  
‘member’	  of	  the	  organisation	  and	  was	  a	   ‘leader’	  within	   it.	  The	  handling	  of	  the	  
visit	  by	   the	  officer	   combined	  with	   the	   fact	   that	  he	  drew	  his	  baton	  during	   the	  
subsequent	  protest	  eroded	  trust	  and	  led	  to	  a	  national	  newspaper	  online	  video	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article	   claiming	   that	   PLTs	   are	   an	   insidious	   and	   illegitimate	   form	   of	   police	  
surveillance	  designed	  to	  criminalise	  peaceful	  protest11.	  	  	  	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  central	  features	  of	  the	  liaison	  role	  is	  to	  identify	  ‘influential’	  people	  in	  
crowds	   in	   order	   to	   work	   with	   them	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   promoting	   ‘self-­‐
regulation’	   and	   therefore	   peaceful	   protest.	  However,	   it	   became	   apparent	   that	  
liaison	   officers	   and	   public	   order	   commanders	   sometimes	  misunderstood	  how	  
social	   influence	   processes	   work	   among	   the	   cultures	   of	   some	   protest	  
communities.	  On	  Saturday	  26th	  May,	  ‘UKUncut’	  –	  another	  ‘transgressive’	  direct	  
action	  protest	  group	  –	  organised	  a	  ‘national	  day	  of	  action’	  around	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  
non-­‐violent	   street	  party12.	   In	  London	   this	  materialised	   as	   four	   separate	   ‘blocs’	  
meeting	   in	  different	   locations13.	  While	   the	  MPS	  were	  aware	   that	   the	  different	  
blocs	  would	  at	  some	  point	  coalesce	  they	  were	  unaware	  where	  this	  would	  take	  
place	   and	   were	   concerned	   about	   the	   underlying	   potential	   for	   problems.	  
Protestors	  were	  reticent	  about	  communicating	  with	  police,	  partly	  exacerbated	  
through	  fear	  that	  they	  would	  be	  ‘kettled’	  and	  as	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  a	  lack	  
of	  trust	  that	  developed	  following	  the	  mass	  arrest	  of	  protestors	  by	  the	  MPS	  for	  
aggravated	  trespass	  when	  UKUncut	  undertook	  an	  ‘occupation’	  of	  ‘Fortnum	  and	  
Masons’	  in	  201114.	  	  	  
	  
The	   PLTs,	   still	   an	   experimental	   unit	   at	   this	   stage,	   were	   utilised	   for	   the	  
surrounding	   policing	   operation	   and	   were	   deployed	   initially	   to	   each	   of	   the	  
protest	   sites	  where	   large	   groups	  had	   gathered.	  Within	   a	   short	   period	  of	   time	  
each	   of	   the	   blocs	   moved	   toward	   and	   coalesced	   at	   Waterloo	   Station,	   where	  
upwards	   of	   1000	   demonstrators	   packed	   onto	   an	   already	   crowded	   concourse.	  
Here	  the	  liaison	  officers,	  who	  had	  also	  travelled	  to	  the	  station,	  were	  tasked	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  This	  perception	  was	  further	  reinforced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  of	  the	  liaison	  officers	  visiting	  the	  
activist’s	  house	  was	  previously	  an	  intelligence	  officer	  who	  was	  well	  known	  to	  and	  widely	  
distrusted	  by	  the	  activist	  community	  in	  Brighton.	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/video/2012/sep/04/police-­‐liaison-­‐officers-­‐uk-­‐uncut-­‐video	  12	  http://www.ukuncut.org.uk/blog/uk-­‐uncut-­‐street-­‐parties-­‐target-­‐architects-­‐of-­‐austerity	  13	  There	  was	  a	  ‘Women’s’	  block’	  gathering	  at	  London	  Bridge;	  A	  ‘Welfare	  Block’	  at	  Waterloo	  
Station	  Concourse;	  ‘NHS	  Block’	  Opposite	  University	  College	  Hospital,	  Euston	  Road;	  and	  a	  ‘Real	  
Democracy’	  Block	  in	  Parliament	  Square.	  14	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/jul/18/fortnum-­‐mason-­‐uk-­‐uncut-­‐charges-­‐dropped	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the	   Sector	   Bronze	   Commander	   to	   engage	  with	   protestors	   to	   “find	   out	   where	  
they	   were	   going”	   which	   at	   this	   stage	   was	   the	   primary	   concern	   of	   the	   police	  
operation.	  This	  tasking	  appeared	  to	  be	  counter-­‐productive	  at	  two	  levels.	  	  
	  
Because	   of	   the	   sophistication	   of	   UKUncut’s	   organisation,	   knowledge	   about	  
their	  ultimate	  intention	  to	  target	  the	  home	  of	  the	  then	  Deputy	  Prime	  Minister	  
was	  limited	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  individuals,	  present	  on	  each	  of	  the	  blocs.	  At	  
opportune	  points	  these	  individuals	  would	  raise	  an	  umbrella,	  a	  different	  colour	  
for	  each	  block,	  as	  a	  signal	  to	  reach	  a	  ‘consensus’	  to	  move	  off.	  	  Consequently,	  it	  
was	   highly	   unlikely	   that	   engagement	   with	   protestors	   by	   the	   PLTs	   asking	  
questions	   about	   where	   they	   were	   going	   would	   produce	   any	   useful	   outcome.	  
Secondly,	  engaging	  with	  protestors	  explicitly	   in	  these	  terms	  merely	  confirmed	  
their	   suspicion	   that	   they	  were	  an	   intelligence-­‐gathering	   tactic	   for	   the	  MPS	   to	  
subsequently	  prevent	  protestors	  from	  achieving	  their	  goal	  of	  peaceful	  assembly	  
(cf.	  Gorringe	  et	  al,	  2011).	  This	  perception	  in	  turn	  undermined	  the	  PLTs’	  ability	  
to	  generate	  positive	  relationships	  of	  trust	  and	  confidence	  among	  protestors.	  	  
	  
In	   contrast	   there	   was	   evidence	   of	   more	   successful	   outcomes	   where	   such	  
sensitivities	  were	  taken	  into	  account	  and	  liaison	  officers	  adapted	  their	  tactical	  
interventions.	  On	  Saturday	  27th	  October	  2012,	  for	  instance,	  	  the	  United	  Friends	  
and	   Families	   Campaign	   held	   a	   protest	   in	  Whitehall.	   The	  march	   is	   an	   annual	  
event	   protesting	   at	   deaths	   in	   custody.	   The	   previous	   year	   there	   had	   been	  
confrontation	   when	   police	   tried	   to	   move	   the	   protestors	   who	   had	   sat	   down	  
outside	   Downing	   Street	   after	   they	   had	   been	   unable	   to	   hand	   in	   a	   petition	   to	  
anyone	   in	   authority.	   Through	   dialogue	   between	   the	   police	   commander	   and	  
protest	  organiser	  certain	  compromises	  were	  agreed	  one	  of	  which	  was	  to	  police	  
the	   event	   exclusively	   with	   liaison	   officers.	   Given	   the	   sensitivities	   the	   liaison	  
officers	  were	  briefed	  not	  to	  go	  into	  the	  crowd	  but	  to	  operate	  on	  the	  periphery,	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Iterative	  interaction	  between	  liaison	  &	  public	  order	  deployment.	  
Our	  data	  also	  suggests	  that	  this	  issue	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  actions	  of	  
the	  liaison	  officers	  and	  perceived	  legitimacy	  was	  not	  just	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  history	  
and	   ideology	   of	   the	   protest	   group	   or	   of	   the	   actions	   of	   liaison	   officers	   in	  
isolation.	   Rather,	   there	   appeared	   to	   be	   a	   complex	   interaction	   between	   the	  
deployment	   of	   liaison	   officers	   and	   other	   public	   order	   tactics.	  On	  Monday	   4th	  
June	  2012	  a	  direct	  action	  protest	  group	  known	  as	   “Smash	  EDO”	  held	  a	  march	  
and	   rally	   from	  North	   Street	   in	  Brighton	   city	   centre	   to	  Hove	  Town	  Hall	   some	  
two	  miles	   away.	   ‘Smash	   EDO’	   demonstrations	   had	   become	   notorious	   among	  
Sussex	  Police	  because	   their	   regular	  protests	  were	  particularly	  hard	   to	  manage	  
and	  consistently	  culminated	   in	   ‘disorder’,	   conflict	  with	   the	  police	  and	  arrests.	  
Given	   this	   history	   smash	   EDO	   demonstrations	   invariantly	   led	   to	   the	  
deployment	   of	   large	   numbers	   of	   public	   order	   resources	   to	   deal	   with	   the	  
perceived	   threat.	   For	   this	   event,	   however,	   Sussex	   Police	   utilised	   their	   rapidly	  
developed	  and	  experimental	  group	  of	   liaison	  officers,	  who	  had	  been	  deployed	  
for	  the	  first	  time	  only	  two	  days	  previously	  at	  Brighton’s	  UKUncut	  ‘street	  party’.	  	  
	  
Initially,	   the	   liaison	  officers	  deployed	  to	   the	  area	  of	  pavement	   in	  North	  Street	  
outside	  Barclays	  Bank,	  where	   the	  demonstrators	  were	   scheduled	   to	   assemble.	  
At	   first,	   the	  number	  assembling	  was	   low	  and	   the	   liaison	  officers	  were	  able	   to	  
establish	  their	  presence	  on	  the	  assembly	  site	  and	  talk	  with	  demonstrators	  who	  
appeared	   to	   respond	  positively,	  although	  somewhat	   reticently.	  However,	  after	  
the	  arrival	  of	  more	  protestors15,	  including	  the	  activist	  whose	  home	  the	  PLT	  had	  
visited,	   the	   liaison	  officers	  began	   to	  experience	   tensions.	   It	  was	  apparent	   that	  
these	  were	  driven	  by	  a	  concern	  among	  protestors	  that	  the	  liaison	  officers	  were	  
actually	   ingratiating	   themselves	   in	   order	   to	   ‘enter’	   the	   crowd	   and	   insidiously	  
gather	   ‘intelligence’	   that	   would	   subsequently	   be	   used	   to	   criminalise	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  These	  included	  a	  group	  of	  ‘anarchists’,	  ‘legal	  observers’	  and	  a	  representative	  of	  an	  
organisation	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘FIT	  watch’.	  It	  was	  also	  the	  case	  that	  a	  freelance	  video	  journalist	  was	  
present	  obtaining	  footage	  for	  the	  subsequent	  webcast	  article	  accusing	  the	  PLTs	  of	  being	  an	  
insidious	  police	  tactic	  for	  gathering	  criminal	  ‘intelligence’.	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protestors.	  Reiterating	  the	  historical	  dimension	  to	  perceptions	  of	  PLT	  activity,	  
trust,	   it	   was	   clear,	   was	   not	   a	   given	   and	   had	   to	   be	   continually	   gained	   and	  
consolidated.	  	  
	  
The	   public	   order	   tactical	   commander	   for	   the	  march	   had	   anticipated	   that	   he	  
would	  use	  PSUs	   to	   create	  a	   ‘box	  escort’16	  toward	   the	   town	  hall	   to	   contain	   the	  
protestors	   and	   prevent	   any	   potential	   for	   them	   to	   occupy	   shops	   or	   otherwise	  
break	  away	  from	  the	  expected	  route17.	  However,	  despite	  the	  hostility	  his	  officers	  
were	  experiencing,	   the	  PLT	  Commander	   judged	   that	   there	  was	  no	   immediate	  
threat	   to	   public	   order	   and	   negotiated	   with	   the	   public	   order	   commander	   to	  
adapt	   his	   tactical	   plan	   to	   allow	   the	   liaison	   officers	   to	   retain	   tactical	   primacy.	  
Given	  the	  history	  of	  these	  protests	  and	  the	  experimental	  status	  of	  the	  PLT,	  the	  
public	   order	   Bronze	   conceded	   only	   to	   remove	   the	   front	   of	   the	   escort,	   but	   to	  
contain	  the	  march	  with	  PSUs	  and	  mounted	  officers	  to	  the	  sides	  and	  rear.	  	  
	  
For	  the	  public	  order	  tactical	  commander	  this	  relatively	  minor	  change	  in	  tactics	  
was	   as	   a	   major	   concession	   since	   it	   went	   against	   the	   tactical	   orthodoxy	   and	  
undermined	   his	   ability	   to	   control	   the	   protest,	   which	   therefore	   opened	   up	  
considerable	   risks,	   should	   things	   go	  wrong.	   	   In	   line	  with	   our	   observations	   at	  
other	   events,	   however,	   the	   tactical	   response	   by	   the	   PSUs	   appeared	   to	   have	   a	  
negative	   impact	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  PLTs	  to	  work	  effectively	   in	  two	  respects.	  
First,	  their	  presence	  became	  essentially	  superfluous	  since	  the	  protest	  was	  now	  
being	   policed	   by	   the	   PSUs	   who	   were	   defining	   the	   ‘boundaries’	   of	   the	  
demonstration.	   Second,	   the	  protestors	   saw	   the	   liaison	  officers	   as	  police	   spies,	  
and	  so	  saw	  their	  very	  presence	  ‘within’	  the	  demonstration	  as	  illegitimate.	  As	  a	  
consequence	  many	  spent	   the	  entire	   time	  harassing	   the	  PLTs	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	  
drive	   them	   away.	   This	   in	   turn	   was	   extremely	   demoralising	   for	   the	   liaison	  
officers	  and	  inhibited	  them	  from	  achieving	  constructive	  outcomes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  This	  term	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  tactic	  of	  containing	  the	  march	  within	  mobile	  cordons	  of	  PSU	  officers.	  17	  There	  was	  no	  official	  organizer	  and	  the	  route	  had	  not	  been	  agreed.	  However,	  Smash	  EDO	  had	  written	  to	  a	  local	  paper	  indicating	  their	  intentions.	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Having	   concluded	   our	   analysis	   of	   the	   observations	   we	   now	   turn	   to	   data	  
gathered	   from	   the	   PLT	   debriefs	   in	   order	   to	   explore	   how	   the	   PLTs’	   wider	  
experiences	  help	  clarify	  and	  expand	  upon	  the	  themes	  identified	  above.	  
	  
PLT	  accounts	  of	  their	  experiences:	  “the	  culture	  needs	  to	  change”.	  
The	  PLTs	  began	  their	  involvement	  on	  some	  events	  at	  the	  planning	  stages.	  They	  
described	   being	   sceptical	   about	   the	   willingness	   of	   protestors	   to	   engage	   and	  
“pleasantly	   surprised”	   by	   the	   relatively	   large	   number	   of	   people	   that	   were	  
“actively	  pleased	  that	  they	  had	  a	  point	  of	  contact”.	  	  By	  September	  2012	  the	  PLTs	  
within	   the	  MPS	   alone	   had	   established	   contacts	  within	   approximately	   seventy	  
protest	  organizations,	   some	  of	  whom	  had	  previously	   “been	   resistant	   to	  police	  
contact”.	  	  
	  
The	  PLTs	   felt	   that	   they	  had	  a	   “hugely	  positive	   response	   from	  organisers”	   and	  
“members	  of	   the	  crowd”.	  This	   “understanding	  and	   level	  of	   trust”	  with	  protest	  
organisers	   allowed	   the	   PLT	   to	   provide	   “reassurances	   and	   fairly	   accurate	  
assessments	  of	  how	  the	  demonstration	  would	  look	  and	  feel	  and	  this	  helped	  in	  
the	   decisions	   made	   about	   resourcing”	   the	   policing	   operation.	   At	   times	   their	  
relationship	   building	   allowed	   them	   to	   reassure	   commanders	   that	   there	   was	  
unlikely	   to	   be	   a	   threat	   when	   intelligence	   reports	   were	   suggesting	   that	   there	  
could	  be.	  The	  ability	  to	  allay	  commanders’	  concerns	  meant	  that	  the	  PLTs	  had	  a	  
direct	  and	  positive	  impact	  on	  “financial	  and	  opportunity	  costs”.	  	  
	  
Some	   of	   the	   groups	   they	   came	   into	   contact	   with	   were	   not	   “experienced	  
protesters”	   but,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	  MPS,	   single-­‐issue	   local	   community	   groups	  
aggrieved	  by	   the	   imposition	   of	   the	  Olympics	   upon	   their	   neighbourhood.	  The	  
PLTs	   described	   how	   these	   protesters	   “were	   quite	   surprised	   by	   the	   amount	   of	  
[police]	  resources	  that	  came	  down”	  when	  they	  were	  having	  their	  protest.	  Over	  
time	  the	  PLTs	  became	  their	  point	  of	  contact	  to	  MPS	  “saying	  look	  we	  are	  having	  
our	   ‘don't	  close	  our	  footpath	  barbecue’	  tomorrow	  could	  you	  let	  them	  know	  so	  
they	  don't	  send	  [the	  TSG]	  down".	  In	  other	  words	  contact	  with	  the	  PLTs	  enabled	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situations	  to	  emerge	  where	  the	  police	  were	  able	  to	  avoid	  what	  would	  otherwise	  
have	  been	  disproportionate	  deployments.	  	  
	  
PLTs	  described	  how	  they	  felt	  that	  they	  had	  “managed	  to	  reduce	  tensions	  on	  a	  
number	   of	   demonstrations".	   In	   particular,	   the	   PLTs	   argued	   that	   where	   they	  
were	   the	   primary	   tactic	   on	   demonstrations	   they	   felt	   they	  were	   able	   to	   police	  
"from	  within"	  with	  all	  the	  other	  resources	  "on	  the	  outside"	  which	  allowed	  PLTs	  
to	   "know	   the	  mood"	  of	   the	   crowd	  and	   encouraged	   ’self-­‐regulation’.	   The	  PLTs	  
asserted	   that	   their	   activity	   "really	   helped	   to	   reduce	   tensions"	   because	   in	   part	  
they	  were	   able	   to	   deliver	  more	   accurate	   risk	   assessments	   to	   the	   public	   order	  
commanders	   and	  manage	  protestors	   perceptions	   and	  behaviours	   through	   the	  
positive	  relationships	  they	  developed.	  
	  
Sometimes	  these	  ‘problem	  solving’	  contributions	  were	  described	  as	  “about	  basic	  
communication”.	   For	   example,	   the	   PLTs	   described	   how	   they	   would	  
communicate	  with	  the	  Public	  Order	  Bronzes	  to	  get	  an	  understanding	  of	   their	  
tactical	  plan	   then	   simply	   set	   about	   communicating	   this	   to	  people	   involved	   in	  
the	  demonstration.	  They	  describe	  how	  on	  occasions	  no	  consideration	  had	  been	  
given	   to	   such	   forms	   of	   basic	   communication	   prior	   to	   their	   involvement.	   To	  
illustrate	  one	  PLT	  described	  a	  demonstration	  where	  there	  were	  “some	  disabled	  
people	  who	  had	  occupied”	  the	  reception	  area	  of	  a	  high	  profile	  building.	  Public	  
order	  resources	  had	  been	  deployed	  and	  a	  cordon	  was	  in	  place	  outside.	  The	  PLT	  
requested	   permission	   from	   the	   Bronze	   Commander	   to	   go	   inside	   and	  
approached	  the	  protestors.	  They	  recounted	  how	  the	  protestors	  told	  them	  that	  
“no	  one	  has	  spoken	  to	  us,	  no	  one	  has	  asked	  us	  how	  long	  we	  are	  going	  to	  stay	  
and	  nobody	  has	  even	  asked	  us	  to	  leave”.	  The	  PLTs	  went	  on	  to	  describe	  how	  the	  
situation	   was	   then	   subsequently	   easily	   resolved	   through	   negotiation	   and	  
dialogue.	   So,	   at	   some	   level,	   having	   units	   specifically	   delegated	   to	   create	  
communication	  was	  resolving	  problems	  that	  were	  “so	  simple	  really".	  
	  
Indeed,	   the	   PLT	   described	   problems	   that	   related	   not	   so	   much	   to	   their	  
relationships	   with	   protesters	   but	   to	   their	   role	   as	   police	   officers	   within	   the	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organisation.	  They	  describe	  tensions	  emerging	  within	  the	  planning	  process	  and	  
when	  they	  were	  deployed	  during	  events,	  with	  public	  order	  commanders	  having	  
no	  clear	  conceptual	  understanding	  of	  how	  to	  utilize	   them	  as	  a	   resource	  or	   to	  
deploy	  them	  tactically.	  They	  described	  how	  “some	  of	  the	  Bronze	  commanders	  
just	  want	  to	  use	  us	  as	  communication	  teams	  and	  no	  more”.	  They	  felt	  that	  this	  
lack	  of	  understanding	  undermined	  their	  capacity	  to	  deliver	  effective	  outcomes	  
because	   they	   were	   either	   tasked	   inappropriately	   or	   public	   order	   resources	  
simply	  took	  over	  making	  it	  impossible	  for	  them	  to	  work.	  	  
	  
They	   describe	   how	   important	   their	   role	   in	   negotiating	   with	   public	   order	  
commanders	  was	  with	  respect	  to	  giving	  the	  PLTs	  the	  time	  and	  opportunity	  to	  
resolve	  incidents	  and	  deliver	  results.	  One	  PLT	  officer	  described	  how	  “I	  thought	  
when	  I	  did	  this	  role	  that	  managing	  the	  crowd	  would	  be	  the	  challenging	  thing,	  it	  
wasn’t.	  Managing	  the	  police	  was	  the	  challenging	  most	  difficult	  bit”.	  They	  also	  
experienced	   issues	   related	   to	   their	   perceived	   integrity	   among	   other	   officers,	  
perceptions	  they	  described	  as	  linked	  to	  their	  relationship	  to	  the	  use	  force	  where	  
"we	   have	   to	   withdraw	   otherwise	   we	   lose	   our	   credibility	   among	   those	   we	   are	  
liaising	   with".	   However,	   such	   ‘backing	   away’	   from	   conflict	   then	   resulted	   in	  
other	   police	   reacting	   negatively	   to	   the	   PLT	   as	   fundamentally	   compromising	  
their	   role	   as	   police	   officers.	   “The	   problem	   is	   that	   public	   order	   policing	   is	  
gladiatorial”	  and	  basically	  this	  “culture	  needs	  to	  change”.	  	  	  
	  
Conclusions.	  
This	  study	  set	  out	  with	  two	  central	  aims;	  the	  first	  to	  add	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  
deployment	  of	  liaison	  or	  dialogue	  teams	  during	  protest	  events.	  In	  particular,	  we	  
sought	   to	   explore	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	  use	  of	   liaison	  officers	   in	   our	   study	  
mirrored	   or	   diverged	   from	   the	   outcomes	   and	   underlying	   processes	   observed	  
elsewhere	  (Holgersson	  &	  Knutsson,	  2011;	  Gorringe	  et	  al,	  2011,	  2012;	  Waddington,	  
2012).	  The	   second	   is	   to	   reflect	  upon	   the	   relevance	  of	  our	  data	  and	  analysis	   to	  
wider	   debates	   in	   the	   academic	   literature	   about	   shifts	   toward	   ‘strategic	  
incapacitation’	  (Gillham,	  2011;	  2012).	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Our	   analysis	   suggests	   that	   the	   interactions	   between	   police	   and	   protestors	  
displayed	  a	  general	  pattern	  similar	   to	   those	  observed	   in	  previous	  studies.	  The	  
liaison	  officers	  appeared	  to	  play	  an	  effective	  role	   in	  reducing	  the	  potential	   for	  
conflict	  during	  events	  by	  opening	  up	  dialogue	  between	  police	  and	  protestors.	  
Their	   ability	   to	   operate	   ‘within’	   crowds	   without	   creating	   tensions	   appears	   to	  
have	  increased	  police	  capacity	  to	  mediate	  and	  manage	  the	  emergent	  ‘problems’	  
they	   were	   confronted	   with,	   particularly	   when	   those	   protests	   involved	   ‘direct	  
action’	  groups.	  	  
	  
As	   with	   previous	   work,	   our	   data	   suggests	   that	   PLT	   ‘legitimacy’	   –	   and	   hence	  
their	  ability	  to	  work	  effectively	  -­‐	  was	  not	  pre-­‐given,	  particularly	  in	  the	  context	  
of	   historical	   and	   entrenched	   intergroup	   hostility	   and	   mistrust.	   Rather,	  
perceptions	   of	   legitimacy	   had	   to	   be	   actively	   constructed	   and	   vociferously	  
maintained.	   Central	   to	   this	   process	   appeared	   to	   be	   the	   liaison	   officers’	  
understanding	  of	   the	  protest	  groups’	  history,	  culture	  and	   identity.	  Where	  this	  
was	  not	  adequately	  understood	  and	  liaison	  officers	  sought	  simply	  to	  assert	  their	  
presence	   ‘within’	   crowds	  or	  were	   tasked	   to	  determine	  a	   ‘transgressive’	  protest	  
group’s	   underlying	   ‘intentions’	   this	   undermined	   their	   capacity	   to	   build	   trust	  
and	  confidence.	  Adding	  weight	  to	  this	  argument,	  it	  was	  also	  evident	  that	  where	  
these	  sensitivities	  were	  understood	  and	  liaison	  officers	  adapted	  their	  approach	  
accordingly,	   this	  appeared	  to	   feed	  positively	   into	  protesters’	  experience	  of	   the	  
liaison	   officers	   and	   their	   role,	   opening	   up	   opportunities	   for	   dialogue	   and	  
communication	  that	  had	  previously	  been	  denied.	  
	  
It	  was	  therefore	  not	  the	  case	  that	  their	  liaison	  officers’	  role	  was	  best	  served	  by	  a	  
rigid	  tactic	  of	  going	  ‘into’	  a	  demonstration	  crowd.	  In	  some	  cases	  this	  was	  clearly	  
counter-­‐productive	   and	   on	   others	   their	   role	   was	   further	   complicated	   by	   the	  
simultaneous	   deployment	   of	   other	   public	   order	   tactics.	   Public	   order	  
commanders	   would	   often	   not	   understand	   the	   role	   and	   function	   of	   liaison	  
officers	   or	   not	   be	   willing	   to	   take	   ‘risks’	   with	   ‘transgressive’	   groups.	   This	   is	  
understandable	  given	  that	  not	  deploying	  public	  order	  resources	  –	  such	  as	  PSUs,	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FITs	   &	   EGTs18	  -­‐	   in	   situations	   of	   ‘risk’	   goes	   against	   the	   current	   orthodoxy.	  
However,	  these	  other	  tactical	  deployments	  appeared	  to	  undermine	  the	  capacity	  
of	   the	   liaison	   officers	   to	   function.	   In	   other	   words,	   liaison	   does	   not	   occur	   in	  
isolation;	  other	  tactics	  produce	  complex	  iterative	  processes	  with	  the	  dynamics	  
of	   crowds	   that	   affect	   the	   perceptions	   of	   PLT	   legitimacy	   and	   ultimately	   their	  
effectiveness.	  	  	  
	  
Another	  important	  feature	  of	  the	  data	  was	  the	  perception	  of	  liaison	  officers	  as	  
‘intelligence	   gatherers’,	   particularly	   among	   transgressive	   groups.	   The	  
development	  of	  liaison	  officers	  has	  not	  occurred	  in	  a	  historical	  vacuum.	  In	  the	  
late	   1990’s	   the	   Metropolitan	   Police	   began	   to	   recognise	   the	   utility	   of	   using	  
football	   ‘spotters’	   in	  protest	   events	   involving	   right	  wing	  political	   groups.	  This	  
tactic	  was	   subsequently	   formalised	   into	   the	  Forward	   Intelligence	  Officer	   role.	  
The	  FITs	  work	  within	  and	  across	  events	  to	  undermine	  the	  anonymity	  of	  those	  
protestors	  that	  are	  perceived	  as	  likely	  to	  become	  involved	  in	  criminality.	  Over	  
the	   past	   decade	   these	   units	   have	   become	   widely	   discredited	   among	   some	  
protest	   groups	  who	   see	   them	  as	   violating	   rights	   of	   privacy	   –	  protected	  under	  
Article	  8	  of	   the	  ECHR	  –	  and	   for	   criminalising	  peaceful	  protestors	   (see	  HMIC,	  
2009b;	  p.	   126-­‐134).	  Our	  data	  highlights	   the	   importance	  of	   this	  history	  and	  the	  
central	  importance	  of	  creating	  transparent	  operational	  and	  structural	  divisions	  
between	  PLTs	  and	  the	  criminal	   intelligence	  resources	  applied	  by	  the	  police	  to	  
protests.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
We	   must,	   of	   course,	   address	   some	   of	   the	   limitations	   of	   this	   research.	   In	  
particular,	   our	   data	   were	   gathered	   during	   activities	   the	   primary	   purpose	   of	  
which	   were	   to	   actually	   produce	   successful	   PLTs;	   teams	   the	   first	   and	   second	  
authors	  were	  instrumental	   in	  creating.	  It	   is	  self-­‐evident	  therefore	  that	  there	  is	  
an	   active	   interest	   in	   promoting	   a	   story	   of	   their	   effectiveness.	   Despite	   this	  
obvious	  tension	  we	  have	  made	  every	  effort	  in	  our	  analysis	  to	  remain	  objective	  
and	   impartial.	   Indeed,	   we	   would	   argue	   that	   our	   focus	   has	   primarily	   been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Forward	  Intelligence	  Teams	  (FITs)	  and	  Evidence	  Gathering	  Teams	  (EGTs)	  are	  overt	  police	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analytical,	   focusing	   on	   the	   ‘negative’	   aspects	   of	   PLT	   deployment	   in	   order	   to	  
draw	  out	  key	  lessons	  for	  progressive	  development.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  
where	  we	  have	  reflected	  upon	  deployments	  by	  Sussex	  Police,	  relative	  to	  those	  
under	  MPS	  jurisdiction	  (although	  the	  themes	  both	  'positive'	  and	  'negative'	  were	  
equally	   evident	   in	   both	   jurisdictions).	   However,	   the	   despite	   the	   ‘teething’	  
problems	  the	  PLT	  in	  Sussex	  equally	  displayed	  good	  practices	  and	  outcomes	  that	  
have	  had	  a	  dramatic	  and	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  policing	  of	  protest	  in	  Sussex	  in	  
line	  with	  our	  arguments	  concerning	  their	  effectiveness.	  Firstly,	  groups	  who	  had	  
never	   previously	   communicated	   with	   police	   now	   do	   so	   on	   a	   regular	   basis.	  
Second,	  the	  Force	  has	  seen	  a	  rapid	  decrease	  in	  the	  requirement	  to	  use	  PSUs	  in	  
the	   policing	   of	   protest	   events.	   Third,	   the	   Force	   is	   experiencing	   a	   dramatic	  
decline	   in	   damage	   to	   property,	   ‘disorder’	   and	   arrests	   during	   previously	   very	  
challenging	  protest	  events	  (beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study).	  Finally,	  the	  Force	  
has	   decided	   to	   divert	   resources	   away	   for	   training	   additional	   PSUs	   and	   divert	  
them	  into	  the	  training	  and	  development	  of	  further	  PLTs	  to	  supports	  its	  now	  full	  
time	  PLT	  unit.	  Similar	  ‘successes’	  have	  been	  experienced	  in	  the	  MPS	  who	  now	  
also	   have	   decided	   to	   ‘mainstream’	   PLTs	   across	   the	   Force	   and	   who	   have	  
established	  a	  full	  time	  unit.	  	  
	  
Nonetheless,	  whilst	  we	  have	  made	  every	  effort	  to	  remain	  impartial	  and	  to	  treat	  
our	   data	   objectively	   we	   are	   constrained	   by	   its	   qualitative	   nature.	  Whilst	   our	  
approach	  offers	  a	   rich	  source	  of	  analysis	  about	  potential	  underlying	  processes	  
we	   must	   cautious,	   particularly	   regarding	   outcomes.	   In	   this	   respect,	   future	  
research	  need	  to	  be	  developed	  utilising	  quantification	  to	  measure	  if	  PLTs	  (and	  
other	   forms	   of	   liaison)	   do	   actually	   have	   the	   effects	   we	   suggest	   are	   occurring	  
(e.g.	   conflict	   reduction)	   and	   if	   these	  outcomes	   are	  mediated	  by	   the	  proposed	  
underlying	   processes.	   On	   this	   basis	   the	   future	   dominance	   of	   any	   specific	  
approach	  to	  public	  order	  policing	  –	  here	  or	  elsewhere	  -­‐	  can	  then	  have	  the	  solid	  
evidence	  basis	  it	  so	  clearly	  requires	  (Hoggett	  &	  Stott,	  2012).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  surveillance	  also	  deployed	  during	  protests.	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Taking	  the	  important	  limitations	  into	  account,	  the	  second	  aim	  of	  the	  paper	  was	  
to	   contribute	   to	  wider	  debates	   in	   the	   academic	   literature	   about	   shifts	   toward	  
‘strategic	   incapacitation’	   (Gillham,	   2011,	   Gillham	   et	   al,	   2012).	   Our	   data	   do	  
suggest	  that	  the	  approach	  being	  adopted	  in	  the	  events	  we	  observed	  is	  closer	  to	  
a	   ‘negotiated	   management’	   style	   of	   protest	   policing.	   The	   operations	   were	  
policed	  from	  a	  perspective	  of	  facilitating	  rights,	  showed	  high	  levels	  of	  tolerance	  
of	  disruption	  to	  the	  wider	  community,	  had	  low	  levels	  of	  arrest,	  almost	  no	  use	  of	  
force	  and	  were,	  by	  definition,	  based	  upon	  dialogue.	  From	  our	  data,	  it	  would	  be	  
difficult	   to	   assert	   a	   creeping	   shift	   toward	   strategic	   incapacitation	   in	   the	   UK,	  
even	   when	   police	   are	   faced	   with	   ‘transgressive’	   protests19	  (c.f.	   Gillham,	   2012).	  
Indeed,	  with	  the	  growth	  and	  spread	  of	  liaison	  officers	  and	  liaison	  based	  public	  
order	   policing,	   our	   data	   begin	   to	   highlight	   how	   an	   active	   reassertion	   of	  
negotiated	  management	  can	  be	  achieved.	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  clarify,	  however,	  that	  we	  are	  discussing	  general	  historical	  and	  
sociological	  trends	  and	  what	  might	  be	  the	  case	  in	  our	  limited	  sample	  of	  events	  
may	   not	   be	   reflective	   of	   the	   general	   pattern	   elsewhere.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   the	   case	  
that	  since	  the	  English	  ‘riots’	  of	  2011	  (Reicher	  &	  Stott,	  2011)	  there	  has	  been	  a	  push	  
toward	  equipping	  and	  training	  more	  officers	   in	   the	  use	  of	  Accelerated	  Energy	  
Projectiles	   (AEPs).	   The	  Government	   has	   also	   undertaken	   formal	   consultation	  
on	   providing	   police	   powers	   to	   impose	   curfews	   (Stott	   et	   al,	   2012)	   and	   police	  
nationally	   have	   focused	   upon	   increasing	   the	   speed	   and	   effectiveness	   of	   their	  
mass	  mobilisation	  capability.	  It	  is	  equally	  relevant	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  
that	  tactics	  of	  surveillance,	   information	  sharing	  and	  the	  control	  of	  space	  were	  
all	   features	   of	   the	   events	   we	   observed	   and	   indeed	   have	   become	   everyday	  
features	  of	  public	  order	  policing	  across	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe.	  In	  this	  
respect	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  arrests	  and	  the	  interference	  of	  rights	  were	  therefore	  all	  
equally	  available	  should	  commanders	  have	  seen	  them	  as	  proportionate.	  In	  this	  
sense	  we	  are	  self	  evidently	  in	  an	  historical	  period	  of	  ‘strategic	  incapacitation’	  in	  
the	  technical	  sense.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Defined	  here	  as	  those	  involving	  non-­‐violent	  direct	  action	  protests	  that	  had	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Our	   argument	   is,	   however,	   that	   it	   is	   not	  merely	   a	   question	  of	   broad	   iterative	  
sociological	   trends	   in	  protest	   tactics	  and	  policing	  across	  decades,	  countries	  or	  
events.	   The	   variability	   between	   negotiated	   management,	   escalated	   force	   and	  
strategic	  incapacitation	  can	  equally	  occur	  across	  minutes	  within	  a	  single	  event.	  
It	  is	  our	  assertion	  that	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  police	  invariably	  start	  their	  planning	  from	  
a	  position	  of	  negotiated	  management	  –	  not	  least	  of	  all	  because	  they	  are	  legally	  
obliged	   to	   do	   so.	   But	   policing	   operations	   are	   dynamic	   and	   liaison	   based	  
approaches	   do	   not	   rule	   out	   a	   shift	   toward	   escalated	   force	   or	   strategic	  
incapacitation	   if	   police	   perceive	   the	   levels	   of	   threat,	   potential	   for	   criminality	  
and	  disruption	  warrant	  this.	  What	  our	  research	  suggests	  is	  that	  such	  shifts	  are	  
less	   likely	   when	   liaison	   officers	   are	   deployed,	   precisely	   because	   their	  
engagement	  with	  protestors,	  ability	   to	  mange	  crowd	  dynamics	  and	  awareness	  
of	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   situation	   enables	   the	   police	   to	   remain	   at	   the	   level	   of	  
negotiated	   management	   (Gorringe	   et	   al,	   2012).	   In	   this	   sense	   whilst	   it	   is	   of	  
course	   relevant	   to	   address	   these	   broad	   sociological	   transitions	   and	   to	   ask	   to	  
what	   extent	   we	   are	   experiencing	   a	   shift	   toward	   a	   ‘securitized	   society’	   it	   is	  
equally	  important	  –	  and	  perhaps	  more	  effective	  -­‐	  to	  focus	  analysis	  on	  the	  tactics	  
and	   iterative	  processes	   occurring	  within	   crowd	  events	   in	  order	   to	  understand	  
how	  to	  empower	  and	  enhance	  democratic	  policing	  styles.	  	  It	  is	  our	  contention	  
that	  this	  research	  on	  human	  rights	  focused	  tactics	  of	  liaison	  based	  public	  order	  
policing	  is	  an	  important	  means	  to	  that	  end	  (Stott	  &	  Gorringe,	  2012).	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  been	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  under	  the	  Public	  Order	  Act	  (1986)	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